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It is well known that after Romanos Diogenes’ sound defeat at Mantzikert in 1071 A.D., the 
Armenians founded their own principalities in Byzantine territory. Yet, their role in the battle 
has not been examined systematically until now. According to Michael the Great, the patriarch 
of the Syrian Orthodox Church, the Armenians were the first to desert from the army. Whereas 
this was accepted as truth in the past, more recently historians have questioned the historicity 
of his statement. This study proposes to solve the problem, and concludes that the Historia of 
Attaleiates contains evidence that corroborates the desertion of the Armenian soldiers.
Middle Ages; 11th Century; Mantzikert (battle of); Armenians; Romanos Diogenes; Tarchanei-
otes/Trachaneiotes; Attaleiates; Michael the Syrian/Michael the Great.
The fateful outcome of the historical encounter between Romanos Dio-
genes and Alp Arslan at Mantzikert (1071 A.D.) paved the way for the expan-
sion of the Seljuk Turks into Anatolia that resulted in the establishment of the 
sultanate of Rum. The Byzantine defeat was the sequel to the internal mach-
inations of the Doukai against Diogenes. The great plethora of sources cov-
ering the event is not always a benefit to an historian undertaking research. 
Differing, often contradictory, information, on the one hand, or reports large-
ly uncorroborated, on the other, makes it quite hard to understand all phases 
of the battle.
This article deals with the World Chronicle of Michael the Great, the pa-
triarch of the Syrian Orthodox Church (1166–1199)1, who asserts: «the Ar-
† In memory of Ruth Macrides, an esteemed colleague and a wonderful person.
This study was supported by the British Institute at Ankara under the Turkish and Black Sea 
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1 For a short biography and bibliography on Michael the Syrian, see the entries by Griffith, 
Michael I the Syrian and Weltecke, Michael the Great. For further details see Weltecke, Origi-
nality and Function, pp. 183-199; and Abrahem, Michael the Great, pp. 33-39. I thank the two 
anonymous readers for their valuable comments and useful suggestions.
Reti Medievali Rivista, 21, 1 (2020)
<http://rivista.retimedievali.it>




Reti Medievali Rivista, 21, 1 (2020) <http://rivista.retimedievali.it>
[2]
menian forces rebelled because the Romans pressured them to accept their 
heresy (the Chalcedonian faith), and they fled and retreated»2. So, how liter-
ally should we take this? Did the Armenian soldiers abandon Diogenes during 
the battle of Mantzikert? Modern scholars mention in passing Michael the 
Great’s statement, but approach it with caution3. The sole exceptions are the 
works of Gérard Dédéyan and Jean-Claude Cheynet. They provide a detailed 
opinion on this issue, arguing for the Armenians’ fidelity and dedication to 
this emperor. This will be thoroughly discussed in the first part below. The 
second proposes an answer to the question set out above, concluding that in 
Attaleiates’ Historia there is evidence to corroborate the Syrian chronicler’s 
statement which, we must note, is not found in other sources.
1. Armeno-Byzantine issues in the military campaigns between 1068 and 1071
This section does not aim at a comprehensive study of the relations be-
tween Byzantines and Armenians in the second half of the eleventh century. It 
rather focuses on the influential parts the latter played between 1068 and 1071 
in the army of Diogenes. Attaleiates, a lawyer and historian who accompanied 
the emperor on all three of his military campaigns, recounts how Hierapolis 
of Syria (Manbij) was taken in 10684. It occurred when an Armenian group 
attacked the city before the Byzantines put away their equipment and had a 
proper rest5. A quite similar event is recorded in the subjugation of Mantzik-
ert three years later (1071). The Armenian infantry men launched a successful 
attack on the citadel before Diogenes (he had been around the city to scope 
the walls) returned to the camp6. In the first case, the Armenians aimed at 
booty. This much at least is self-evident. «They conveyed much grain and oth-
er provisions, for they found plenty of those there, a bit of wine, and items of 
quite small value. As regards more valuable spoils, they failed [to find], for the 
enemy had packed them up and had taken away with them in their escape»7. 
2 See Michael the Great, The Syriac Chronicle, p. 609. It may also be of some interest to pro-
vide here the translation of Chabot’s classical edition of Michael the Great’s Chronique, p. 169: 
«Les troupes des Arméniens qu’ils voulaient contraindre à adopter leur hérésie, prirent la fuite 
les premières et tournèrent le dos dans la bataille». We should note that the statement is not 
included in the Armenian version of the Syriac original that has been translated by Langlois, 
Chronique de Michel le Grand. See also note 25 below.
3 E.g. Vryonis, Jr., Decline of Medieval Hellenism, p. 103; Cahen, La campagne de Mantzikert, 
p. 635; and Friendly, Dreadful Day, p. 192.
4 Hierapolis belonged to the Mirdāsids of Aleppo. The emir Mahmūd captured it on 20 August 
1065. Diogenes took possession of Hierapolis in 1068. See Elisséeff, Manbidj, p. 379; Beiham-
mer, Emergence, pp. 119-120.
5  References follow the edition in Pérez-Martín, Miguel Ataliates. Historia, pp. 82.22-83.2 
[thereafter, Attaleiates]. For the sake of convenience, the pagination of the English translation 
by Kaldellis and Krallis, History, will be provided in parenthesis (p. 199).
6 Attaleiates, p. 113.5-17 (pp. 275-277).
7 Attaleiates, p. 83.5-9 (p. 201), «καὶ σιτίων μὲν καὶ τῆς ἄλλης διατροφῆς εἰς κόρον μετακομιδὴν 
ἐποιήσαντο, ἀφθονίαν γὰρ τούτων εὗρον ἐκεῖσε καὶ οἴνου τι μέρος καὶ τῶν εὐτελεστάτων εἰδῶν, τῶν δὲ 
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In the second case, there is no solid evidence to reach a firm conclusion. Yet, 
the likelihood that the Armenians were motivated by the same desire is not 
remote. There is a point in the Historia to strengthen it. Attaleiates does not 
defend the emperor’s decision to end the 1069 campaign, proposing instead: 
«Why should we not take by siege the city of Chliat and the small towns [situ-
ated] below it so as the soldiers will be satisfied with the [collection of] spoils 
and become more willing [to fight]?»8. His proposal seems most likely to echo 
the discontent among soldiers unpaid for long time9. The Armenians, who 
made up an important proportion of Diogenes’ army10, cannot be excluded. 
This would justify their hasty attacks on both Hierapolis and Mantzikert after 
long approach marches. The outcome of those attacks must be ascribed to the 
prowess and fighting skills of the Armenian soldiers. This is more evident in 
the case of Mantzikert. In the Synopsis Historion, John Skylitzes gives some 
significant details about the city’s fortification. It was surrounded, he says, 
by a triple curtain wall and secured sustainable supplies of spring water. Its 
capture, therefore, in less than a day was an enormous achievement for the 
Armenians, if we bear in mind that the sultan Tughrul Beg was storming it 
for one month with no success11. Another point that deserves some attention 
is that neither of the attacks was ordered by Diogenes. This means that the 
Armenians performed an impulsive act of bravery which, we note, does not 
comply with the military science and tactics of the Byzantines. The anony-
mous treatise peri strategikes warns that the lust for booty may turn into 
dangerous collisions among plunderers; and such collisions were not unusual 
in the ranks of the army12. As concerns the Armenian attack on the citadel of 
Mantzikert, Attaleiates reports that «the emperor was delighted with what 
had occurred (i.e. its successful outcome)»13, although the Taktika of Leo VI 
squarely condemns such incidents of unruly behaviour14.
An episode that also merits attention happened after the Byzantines’ de-
feat outside the camp at Hierapolis, while the soldiers inside refused to help 
those in need. Attaleiates vividly describes what followed after the emperor, 
who had been trying with the Cappadocians to take control of a tower still in 
enemy hands, returned to the camp: «that night everyone had low expecta-
tions, also because all the Armenian foot soldiers (they had been placed as 
τιμιωτέρων λαφύρων ἀπέτυχον, προλαβόντων τῶν πολεμίων καὶ συσκευασαμένων αὐτὰ μεθ᾿ ἑαυτῶν 
ἐν τῷ ἀποδρᾶναι».
8 Attaleiates, p. 98.21-23 (p. 239), «Διὰ τί δὲ καὶ μὴ ἐκ πολιορκίας αἱρήσομεν τό τε ἄστυ τὸ Χλίατ 
καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τούτου πολίχνια, ἵνα καὶ οἱ στρατιῶται τῆς ἐκ τῶν λαφύρων ὠφελείας πλησθῶσι καὶ 
προθυμότεροι γένωνται».
9 For further discussion on this issue, see Vryonis, Jr., The Eleventh Century, pp. 24-25. 
10 Charanis, The Armenians, p. 20, maintains that the Armenians predominated in the Byzan-
tine army from the ninth century to the Crusades. Also, Andrews, Prolegomena, p. 91, is of the 
opinion that the Armenians made up much of Diogenes’ army.
11 Ioannis Scylitzae Synopsis  Historiarum, p. 462.54-60.
12 Three Treatises, pp. 118.23-120.26.
13 Attaleiates, p. 113.17 (p. 277), «Ἡσθέντος δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως τῷ γεγονότι».
14 The Taktika of Leo VI, p. 286.83-88.
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night guards around the trench in front of the palisade) considered to leave 
[their posts], refusing to obey the squad leaders»15. It is notable that the peri 
paradromes polemou, the late tenth-century military treatise which had 
been falsely ascribed to Nikephoros II Phokas16, pays special attention to the 
inadequacy of Armenian infantry men in carrying out sentry duties17. Attalei-
ates does not tell us why they thought to leave their positions. It is known that 
the army of Diogenes was a motley force comprised of numerous ethnicities 
which hardly co-operated with each other18. It may be of some importance to 
mention here an incident that took place in the expedition of 1069, when the 
Byzantines joined battle with an enemy detachment close to Larissa. Attalei-
ates recounts that whilst the pursuit was still taking place, a Turkish group 
attacked the imperial camp. The attack was driven off by the Franks only, be-
cause the Byzantines stayed inactive19. The bad co-operation between native 
soldiers and other minorities must not be exclusively ascribed to ethnic or re-
ligious quarrels20, since there are other factors – like the fighting skills or the 
morale of indigenous soldiers – that played a role. Yet, the question remains 
as to why Diogenes continued to trust Armenians, although there are doubts 
on their loyalty. To this I will come later.
As concerns the campaign of 1071, there are two more events, excerpt-
ed from the Armenian sources of Matthew of Edessa and Aristakes of Lasti-
vert,21 that need further consideration. Upon arriving at Sebasteia, Diogenes 
received numerous complaints about the aggression of Armenian people. 
Giving credence to those «false accusations», he promised to root out the Ar-
menian faith after the end of his expedition. In the pillaging that followed at 
his behest, «many were killed, all because of the unjustly and falsely reached 
judgements of the impious emperor Diogenes»22. The detail is not repeated by 
15 Attaleiates, p. 86.4-6 (p. 207), «ἡ νὺξ ἐκείνη πάντας εἶχεν ἐν ἐλπίσιν οὐκ ἀγαθαῖς, καθότι καὶ τὸ 
πεζὸν ἅπαν τῶν Ἀρμενίων, ἐπιταχθὲν διανυκτερεύειν περὶ τὴν τάφρον ἐν προτειχίσματι, ἀποστασίαν 
ἐσκόπησε, μὴ πειθαρχῆσαν τοῖς λοχαγοῖς». The event is repeated in the chronicle of the Continua-
tor of Skylitzes: He synecheia tes chronographias tou Ioannou Skylitze, p. 130.14-16 [hereafter, 
Skylitzes Cont.].
16 See Dennis’ introduction to the text, Three Treatises, p. 139.
17 Three Treatises, p. 152.11-23. Another report of similar content is found in the Novella of 
Nikephoros II Phokas where the Armenians are described as an «unsteady and unpredictable 
[nation]» (τὸ γὰρ τῶν ἀρμενίων ἄστατον καὶ πολυπλανὲς). See Svoronos, Les novelles, p. 170.7-8.
18 Apart from the Armenians in Diogenes’ army, Attaleiates mentions Scythians, p. 78.5 (p. 
189), p. 118.10 (p. 289); Russians, p. 84.6 (p. 203); Franks, p. 111.12 (p. 271), and Nemitzoi, p. 
110.5 (p. 269). See more by Charanis, The Byzantine Empire in the Eleventh Century, p. 192.
19 Attaleiates, p. 96.3-7 (pp. 231-233); Skylitzes Cont., pp. 135.24-136.1.
20 Bedrosian, Armenia during the Seljuk and Mongol Periods, p. 243, remarks that the vast 
shift of native Armenians to new estates (mostly in Cappadocia and norther Mesopotamia) 
and the dismissal of the local Armenian forces from their homeland in 1055 did exacerbate 
the Byzantine-Armenian ethnic tensions. The unwise decision of the emperor Constantine IX 
Monomachos left Armenia defenseless and leaderless.   
21 On Armenian chroniclers in general see the useful article by Dowsett, Armenian Historiog-
raphy, pp. 259-268.
22 Matthew of Edessa, Armenia and the Crusades, pp. 132-133. Smbat Sparapet repeats this in-
formation. English translation of the text has been made available: Bedrosian < https://archive.
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Vardan, the thirteenth-century Armenian cleric, who merely reports that the 
emperor had threatened, «to make the Armenians completely Grecised»23. 
Modern historians express reservations about the accuracy of Matthew’s ac-
count24; but can it be entirely fabricated? It must be noted that Vardan did 
not consult the source of Matthew. He drew upon the Armenian version of 
Michael the Syrian’s text which is of independent value25. Diogenes’ threat 
against the Armenian citizens is thus encountered in two different chronicles, 
without any evidence that they copy from one another. We note that Aristakes 
of Lastivert, who is contemporary with this event, makes no mention of it26. 
This is because his account does not focus on the campaign, but on the actual 
battle. Nor does he mention the capture of Mantzikert by the Armenian in-
fantry men. This might have to do with the purpose for which he wrote the 
Chronicle27. Besides, it does not sound likely that Greeks and Armenians lived 
in entire harmony, especially after the massive settlement in Sebasteia of Sen-
acherim – the former king of Vaspurakan – who took with him, apart from his 
family, a large retinue28. Those settlements were often associated with deep 
changes in the ethnic compositions of the rural and urban areas, generating 
tensions within communities. It is probable that the Armeno-Byzantine ten-
sions grew stronger after the pillaging of Sebasteia by the Turks in 105929 and 
reached their peak when the emperor Constantine X Doukas threatened to 
enforce the Chalcedonian formula on the Armenians in 106330. Nina Garsoïan 
suspects, but with no absolute evidence, that this threat was presumably not 
implemented31. Nonetheless, even in that case, it is indicative of the dispu-
tations between Greeks and Armenians. It must be also observed that there 
are certain cases of Armenians who “collaborated” with the Turks because of 
org/details/SmbatSparapetsChronicle/mode/2up > [last access, 4 March 2018], p. 30.
23 The Historical Compilation of Vardan Arewelc‘i, p. 195, §57].  For the sources of his work, see 
Thomson, Vardan’s Historical Compilation, pp. 343-352, esp. 350.
24 Garsoïan, Armenian Integration, p. 82, expressed the opinion that Matthew’s statement 
«may reflect nothing more than a memory of the traditional confessional hostility in this city».
25 The Historical Compilation of Vardan Arewelc‘i, p. 136. As concerns the Armenian version 
of Michael the Great’s work, Haase, Die armenische Rezension der syrischen Chronik Michaels 
des Grossen, pp. 60-82, 271-284, notes that it is not a close translation of the Syriac original, 
but a free adaptation with several abbreviations, omissions or additions for Armenian purposes. 
One of those Armenian translations was made in 1245 by the priest Yeshu‘; and it was revised by 
Vardan Arewelc‘i. The text was published at Jerusalem in 1871 (Ignatius Aphram Barsum, The 
Scattered Pearls, p. 446). 
26 Aristakes wrote sometime between 1072 and 1079. For the content of his book see Bartikian, 
To Byzantion eis tas Armenikas pegas, pp. 93-96.
27 On this, see Thomson, Medieval Armenian Historians, pp. 95-96. Also, Thomson, Armenian 
Literary Culture, pp. 235-236.
28 If we may believe the Continuator of Thomas Ardzrouni, Senacherim immigrated to his new 
place with 16,000 of his compatriots. This number does not include women and children. See 
Charanis, The Armenians, p. 50, note 197.
29 Matthew of Edessa, Armenia and the Crusades, pp. 95-96. See also note 20 above.
30 See discussion in Vryonis, Jr., Social Basis of Decline, pp. 170-171; Vryonis, Jr., Decline of 
Medieval Hellenism, pp. 93-94.
31 Garsoïan, Armenian Integration, p. 81. Cf. Bedrosian, Armenia during the Seljuk and Mon-
gol Periods, p. 245.
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their problems with the Greeks32. For this reason, it has been argued that the 
Armenian people, in the face of external danger, preferred to side with the 
enemy of Byzantium33. It seems thus that Matthew of Edessa’s statement is 
not without some truth34. The heavy massacre in the streets of Sebasteia, as 
depicted by the chronicler, sounds unconvincing. Yet, the Armeno-Byzantine 
discord and the partiality of the emperor in favour of the Greeks sound more 
credible. This could be further reinforced by his reaction in events of similar 
nature that reveal his abrupt manners: the unverified accusations that the 
Latin leader, Robert Crispin, secretly planned to undermine him in the 1069 
expedition;35 and the unjust punishment inflicted on a native soldier for hav-
ing stolen a donkey in the expedition of 107136.
The second event is narrated by Aristakes who wrote his chronicle only a 
few years after the battle was fought. It is unclear, however, what the origins 
of his material might have been. When the two armies met at Mantzikert, a 
large group that was comprised of non-Christians deserted to the Turks. Their 
desertion caused much confusion in the Byzantine army. Being unaware of 
what had occurred, Diogenes, in the author’s words, «was angry with the Ar-
menian corps and with the entire Armenian nation, and he looked upon them 
with contempt». Despite that many Armenians «harboured hostile feelings 
towards the emperor», they did not abandon their position. The latter became 
impressed by their courage and fighting spirit, and promised them rewards37. 
Perhaps his anger reflects his fear that the Armenians might follow the group 
of non-Christians. It is of equal importance that the emperor’s anger extend-
ed to their whole nation38 and also that the Armenians had similar feelings 
towards him. We do not know whether their hatred was sparked by his harsh 
behaviour or by his threat to eradicate their faith. Although the first can be 
suggested as the most reasonable explanation, the Armenian fidelity at Man-
tzikert should be taken with caution39, since patriotism was indeed a main 
factor that inspired the writing of Armenian chroniclers, as modern histo-
rians confirm40. It is striking that Matthew is silent on how his compatriots 
fought. After his reference to the death of the two Armenian magnates, named 
32 Danişmendnâme, p. 129. Also, Garsoïan, Armenian Integration, p. 124.
33 Charanis, Armenians and Greeks, p. 31.
34 Thomson, Influence, pp. 435-436, does not dispute the historicity of Matthew’s account at 
this point.
35 Attaleiates, pp. 94.20-95.1 (p. 229). Also, see discussion in Magdalino, Byzantine Back-
ground, p. 30.
36 Attaleiates, p. 114.7-17 (p. 279). Haldon, The Krites tou Stratopedou, p. 283.
37 Aristakes of Lastivert, Récit des malheurs, p. 126.
38 Perhaps Diogenes never forgot that his rebellion against the imperial authorities in 1067 was 
betrayed by a trusted adviser of Armenian origin. Skylitzes Cont., pp. 121.24-122.4. It must be 
noted here that Der Nersessian, Armenia in the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries, p. 428, refers to 
Aristakes, John Catholicos, and Stephen Asolik as quite reliable historians.
39 Thomson, Influence, p. 433, remarks that «the allegiance of the Armenians was perforce 
demanded by the empire, but they were not very loyal subjects».
40 E.g. Dowsett, Armenian Historiography, pp. 262-263.
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Khatap and Vasilak, on the first, as he claims, day of the battle41, he forbears 
to report how the rest performed during the second, and most decisive, day.
2. The two Armenian commanders, Brachamios and Chatatourios
Before giving a solution to the problem discussed here, let us close with 
some comments on two Armenian generals, Philaretos Brachamios and 
Chatatourios. The former had been entrusted by Diogenes with the greatest 
part of the army in the campaign of 1069. In the text of Attaleiates we read 
that, «he was a man boasting of his military successes, but lived a shameful 
and defamed life. Whereas he had several times fought against that nation 
(i.e. the Turks), he had lost the most decisive battles and, as it is reasonable, he 
was utterly detested. He did not refrain from them, for he aimed at the chief 
command due to his greed for gain and glory»42. This passage is an indirect 
blame for Diogenes’ judgement and a pointed criticism against Philaretos who 
had entirely failed to defend the eastern boundaries, as his soldiers scattered 
about and took refuge in the mountains of Taurus43. We already mentioned 
that the greed for gain (φιλοκέρδεια) was the main motive of his compatri-
ots for attacking Hierapolis, since the army had been unpaid for a long time. 
Thus, it is sensible to assume that the loyalty of one motivated by personal 
gain and the need for personal achievement cannot be guaranteed. 
At first sight, this seems not to apply to the case of Chatatourios, the other 
Armenian general who served as doux of Antioch and helped Diogenes to try 
to get back the throne after his release from the Seljuk camp44. Attaleiates 
describes him as, «a brave man who earlier had shown many marks of his 
excellence»45. Further down, however, he blames him and his soldiers for hes-
41 Matthew of Edessa, Armenia and the Crusades, p. 134.
42 Attaleiates, p. 99.16-20 (p. 241), «τῷ Φιλαρέτῳ, ἀνδρὶ στρατιωτικὴν μὲν αὐχοῦντι περιωπήν, 
αἰσχροῦ δὲ βίου καὶ διαβεβλημένου τυγχάνοντι καὶ τῷ ἔθνει μαχεσαμένῳ μὲν διαφόρως, ἐν δὲ τοῖς 
μεγίστοις καταπολεμηθέντι καὶ καταφρονηθέντι ὡς τὸ εἰκός, οὐ μὴν ἀπεχομένῳ τούτων, ἀλλ᾿  ἐπιτρέχοντι 
τὴν ἡγεμονίαν διὰ φιλοκερδείας καὶ φιλοδοξίας ὑπόθεσιν»; also Skylitzes Cont., p. 136.19-24. Bra-
chamios is presented negatively by Matthew of Edessa, Armenia and the Crusades, too, pp. 
137-139, 147, 150. He is depicted with epithets that were used in the prophecies of the varda-
pet Yovhannēs Kozeṙn. See Thomson, Medieval Armenian Historians, p. 97; and Andrews, 
Prophecy, pp. 105-123. The pagination follows the internet-based edition < https://boris.unibe.
ch/43067/1/Andrews_medchron.pdf > [last viewed on 6 May 2018], p. 13.
43 Attaleiates, p. 100.13-16 (p. 243). Charanis, The Armenians, p. 34, notes that the Armenians, 
«could not be relied on to keep their posts». An elaborate discussion about the Brachamioi in 
the Byzantine empire and Philaretos during Romanos IV’s reign is provided in the first chapter 
of the study of Dédéyan, Les Armeniens entre Grecs, Musulmans et Croisés, pp. 5-73. On the 
reconstruction of Philaretos’ career, see Seibt, Philaretos - General, Rebell, Vasall?, p. 286 and 
pp. 293-294. On his seals, see Koltsida-Makre, Philaretos Brachamios, Portrait of a Byzantine 
Official, pp. 325-332.
44 Attaleiates, p. 127.14-20 (p. 313); Skylitzes Cont., p. 153.14-16.
45 Attaleiates, pp. 102.25-103.1 (p. 248); Skylitzes Cont., p. 138.12-13. The courage of Chatatou-
rios is mentioned by Nicéphore Bryennios, Histoire, p. 127.21, who refers to him as a man «with 
deep judgement, and [a man] brave in fight» (τὴν γνώμην βαθύς, τὴν χεῖρα γενναῖος). 
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itating to launch a surprise attack against a band of Turkish raiders on their 
return from Ikonion, «under the excuse that they [might] disperse those who 
had not scattered about»46. This was because the Turks had been forced to 
leave their booty at Seleukeia, while ambushed by Armenian bandits47. Chata-
tourios, therefore, had very little or nothing to gain from an attack. From this 
viewpoint, we can conclude that his loyalty was compromised by his desire 
to plunder. It is not an accident that Psellos (an eleventh-century monk, pol-
itician, philosopher, and historian) extols Chatatourios for his «deep judge-
ment»; but shortly later, he adds that, «in character he was hostile towards 
us (i.e. the Byzantines)»48. Does his statement imply a wider view about the 
Armenian component in the empire? The possibility should not be discount-
ed. Earlier in the same campaign, Diogenes stayed longer at Keltzene for fear 
that native soldiers spread out through the mountains of Taurus would be, in 
Attaleiates’ wording, a comfortable target for the local Armenians. Cheynet 
maintains that the wider region was frequently subject to robberies49. His the-
ory is not supported by evidence in Attaleiates’ Historia in which we read that 
Diogenes stayed to receive the refugees, «so that they might not be caught 
scattered in isolation and killed by the Armenians»50. Diogenes, thus, would 
not risk a delay of the campaign’s implementation, should he had not been 
worried about soldiers whose lives were in great danger.
3. The proposed solution to the problem through the Historia of Attaleiates 
Peter Charanis has no doubts that the Armeno-Byzantine problems played 
a role in the battle of Mantzikert51. More recent scholars have expressed a dif-
ferent opinion. Dédéyan, for example, rejects Michael the Syrian’s statement, 
and concludes that the Uzes in the imperial army were the first to desert52. 
Without disputing the Armenians’ hostility towards Diogenes, Dédéyan the-
orises that they united under a common enemy, the Seljuk Turks. His theo-
ry, however, overlooks cases of Armenians who collaborated with Turks or 
Franks53. In line with the scholarship of Dédéyan, Cheynet assumes that the 
twelfth-century polemists impose an anachronistic value-judgement on their 
46 Attaleiates, p. 103.15 (p. 251). The Continuator of John Skylitzes, who copies most of Attalei-
ates’ writings, does not follow his root source at this point.
47 Cheynet, Les arméniens, p. 71, note 22. This event is also recounted by Attaleiates, p. 103.6-9 
(pp. 249-251), and by Skylitzes Cont., p. 138.15-17.
48 Michaelis Pselli Chronographia, VII, b.34, p. 278.1-2, «τὴν γνώμην βαθύς, δυσμενὴς ἡμῖν τῆς 
προαιρέσεως».
49 See discussion in Cheynet, Les arméniens, p. 71, note 23.
50 See Attaleiates, pp. 101.25-102.1 (p. 247), «ἵνα μὴ καταλαμβανόμενοι σποράδες ἐξ ἐρήμης ὑπὸ 
τῶν Ἀρμενίων ἀπόλωνται». Also, Skylitzes Cont., p. 137.23-24.
51 Charanis, Armenians and Greeks p. 25; Charanis, Cultural Diversity, p. 20.  
52 Dédéyan, L’immigration arménienne en Cappadoce, p. 115.
53 See notes 32 and 33 above. It is noted that Bedrosian, Armenia during the Seljuk and Mongol 
Periods, p. 245 says about it: «Some few Armenians saw the anti-Byzantine Turks not as the 
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references to the Armeno-Byzantine tensions which flared up during the sec-
ond half of the eleventh century54. His view does not take into consideration 
the events detailed by the eleventh-century writers Attaleiates and Aristakes, 
and discussed earlier in this study. It is true, as Cheynet observes, that no-
where in the Historia the Armenians are treated offensively by Diogenes55. 
This must not be interpreted to mean that he ratified their acts of indisci-
pline56. Instead, he declined to inflict punishments for fear that they might 
rise up in rebellion. This took place with the German mercenaries in the 1071 
campaign57. To further support his arguments, Cheynet gives some good ex-
amples of Armenians who fought beside Diogenes58. We do not expect that all 
the Armenians in the army were unruly or hostile. Also, it is essential to draw 
a clear-cut distinction between the Armenian citizens of Sebasteia whom Dio-
genes threatened to grecise, and the Armenian soldiers he relied on to achieve 
his military objectives and to secure his imperial position further. The fact 
that Attaleiates says nothing about the episode at Sebasteia does not mean 
that it never happened. It is perhaps inflated by Matthew of Edessa, as said 
earlier. Moreover, it is to be remembered that Michael Attaleiates places more 
focus upon the military side of the events that led to the battle at Mantzikert.
The solution to the problem under investigation is found in the Historia 
of Attaleiates. Apart from the desertion of the Uzes, which is recounted by 
Attaleiates and Aristakes, we have another desertion that took place earlier 
in time: that of the magister Joseph Tarchaneiotes, who had been despatched 
to Chliat with orders to reinforce the Scythian allies and the Franks under 
Roussel de Bailleul, the Latin leader59. When Diogenes called upon him for 
assistance, Joseph Tarchaneiotes «took all his forces, and, by fleeing coward-
ly through Mesopotamia, he hurried into Roman land, without, this fearful 
man, considering his master or the right»60. Jonathan Shepard refutes Jo-
seph Tarchaneiotes’ act of disobedience. He exculpates him from any charge 
of conspiracy, theorising that either the couriers had not been sent off; or they 
agents of God sent to punish Armenians for their sins, but as an excellent vehicle opportunely 
available to themselves for vengeance against the Greeks».
54 Cheynet, Pouvoir et contestations, p. 401, note 113, and p. 402. For the sources of the period 
see Weltecke, Die ‘Beschreibung der Zeiten’ von Mor Michael dem Grossen, pp. 220-249. Ac-
cording to Charanis, The Armenians, p. 34, these accusations cannot be completely dismissed, 
since they are recorded in official sources.
55 Cheynet, Les arméniens, p. 71.
56 When the Armenians failed to attack the Turks traversing Mopsuestia, Attaleiates, p. 103.23 
(p. 251) remarks that «the emperor was distressed when he learnt [the news]» (ἀνία μὲν κατέσχε 
τὸν βασιλέα πυθόμενον).
57 Attaleiates, p. 110.1-15 (pp. 267-269); Skylitzes Cont., pp. 143.27-144.6.
58 Cheynet, Les arméniens, p. 71; Cheynet, Pouvoir et contestations, p. 401.
59 Attaleiates, p. 111.23-26 (p. 273); Skylitzes Cont., p. 144.22-24; Nicéphore Bryennios, His-
toire, p. 109.6-15. The Scythian allies and the Frankish troops were detached from the main 
army when Diogenes arrived at Theodosioupolis.  
60 Attaleiates, p. 118.5-7 (p. 289), «ἄρας τοὺς ἀμφ᾿ αὐτὸν ἅπαντας διὰ τῆς Μεσοποταμίας φυγὰς 
ἀγεννῶς εἰς τὴν Ῥωμαίων ἐνέβαλε, μηδένα λόγον τοῦ δεσπότου μήτε μὴν τοῦ εἰκότος ὁ δείλαιος 
θέμενος». Also, Skylitzes Cont., 147.15-18.
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failed to deliver the imperial order to Chliat; or they arrived late61. Yet, the 
accounts of the Continuator of John Skylitzes, John Zonaras62, and Matthew 
of Edessa63 confirm that the magister had been informed by the couriers, but 
he ignored the call for help. Alexander Beihammer chose to interpret Tarcha-
neiotes’ retreat as a precautious measure to ensure the safety of his troops64. 
The decision was made after the defeat of Bryennios and Basilakios in the 
preliminaries to the encounter at Mantzikert. It seems that Beihammer takes 
for granted that Tarchaneiotes was aware of the number and strength of the 
Seljuk army or of the sultan’s plans, when negotiating a peace agreement with 
Diogenes. There is no indication within the text of Attaleiates, or of Matthew 
of Edessa, to corroborate such a possibility. I have recently suggested that 
Tarchaneiotes’ withdrawal from the scene should not be linked to the schem-
ing of the Doukas faction. It rather has to do with Diogenes’ arrogance that led 
him to ignore advice on issues of strategy and rely upon his own judgement. 
Accordingly, the titles of proedros and doux of Antioch he gained when Mi-
chael VII Doukas occupied the throne, were not his reward for his co-oper-
ation with the leading conspirators (i.e. the Doukai), but for the outcome of 
the battle that brought about the removal of Diogenes, their political enemy, 
from power65.
The armed forces of Tarchaneiotes, Attaleiates says, «were more trained 
[than others] in the “dance of war”, and always fighting in the front line»66. 
In short, the magister had been entrusted with the army’s elite regiment. But 
what was their ethnic composition? The question is answered later in the His-
toria: Bryennios was sent off against a group of Seljuks who harassed the 
foraging parties of the army. After his failure to drive them away, Diogenes 
also despatched Basilakes, the katepano of Theodosioupolis67, who moved 
there «with some local soldiers», asserts Attaleiates, «because the rest had 
been with Trachaneiotes at Chliat»68. Theodosioupolis (mod. Erzurum) had 
been captured in 949 by John Tzimiskes. Yet, it was permanently annexed 
to the Byzantine state after 1000, when David of Tao – the Georgian prince 
61 Shepard, Byzantinorussica, pp. 220-222. Leveniotis, Stasiastiko kinema, pp. 95-99, shares 
Shepard’s view.
62 Skylitzes Cont., p. 147.16-17; Zonaras, Epitomae historiarum, 699.10-11.
63 For the reference see note 77 below.
64 Beihammer, Emergence, p. 156.
65 Vratimos, Tarchaneiotes and the Battle of Mantzikert (Published online by «Al-Masāq» on 
26th December 2019) < https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/09503110.2019.170
4121?scroll=top&need Access=true > [last access: 9 January 2019].
66 Attaleiates, p. 117.23-24 (p. 287), «συνήθως ἀεὶ προπολεμοῦντας καὶ ἠσκημένους μᾶλλον τὴν 
πυρρίχιον ὄρχησιν».
67 Attaleiates, p. 115.2-23 (pp. 281-283). Nicéphore Bryennios, Histoire, pp. 109.15-111.23, 
notes that his homonymous grandfather was chronologically sent after Basilakes failed to force 
the Seljuks back.
68 Attaleiates p. 115.23-24 (p. 283), «μετά τινῶν ἐγχωρίων στρατιωτῶν, ὡς τῶν λοιπῶν ὄντων μετὰ 
τοῦ Τραχανειώτου εἰς τὸ Χλίατ».
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of the Bagratid dynasty – died69. It became the centre of the theme of Iberia. 
The author informs that the city had been recently reconstructed and rein-
habited after the pillaging of Artze (Arcn) in the mid-eleventh century70. The 
Armenians in eastern frontier themes were quite numerous71. It is reasonable 
to assume that their numbers in Theodosioupolis did not differ much. What 
does this «local soldiers» really mean? In the section depicting Diogenes’ re-
lease from the Seljuks, we read that he arrived at Theodosioupolis in order 
for to receive a treatment for his injury, and to replace his Seljuk costume 
with an imperial robe, «for he was about to go farther off, to Roman land»72. 
If, for Attaleiates, Theodosioupolis was an Armenian city, then we are bound 
to conclude that the men under the command of Basilakes and Tarchaneiotes 
were Armenians too73. This is further reinforced by his reference to the be-
trayal of Tarchaneiotes who withdrew «into Roman land»74. It must be said 
that Attaleiates is not the sole historian to confuse Byzantine with Armeni-
an territories due to their large Armenian population. Leo the Deacon, the 
tenth-century historian, calls the region of the Byzantine Lykandos as: «land 
of the Armenians»75. Apart from Leo’s, we have another history written by 
an anonymous author of the first crusade, in which we are told that the Cru-
saders considered as Armenian the territory that extends beyond Herakleia 
towards Caesarea in Cappadocia76.
A reference to Tarchaneiotes’ act of betrayal is also found in the text of 
Matthew of Edessa. He reports that the magister «and the other Roman mag-
nates had returned to Constantinople with their troops»77; but he does not 
denote their ethnic identity78. Matthew puts Tarchaneiotes’ retreat on the first 
day of the battle, though modern historians actually isolate the preliminaries 
69 Holmes, Basil II and the Governance of Empire, pp. 319-321. For a detailed discussion of the 
topic, see Garsoïan, Annexation of the Armenian Kingdoms, pp. 188-193.
70 Attaleiates, pp. 110.25-111.6 (p. 271).
71 Charanis, The Armenians, p. 31; Garsoïan, Armenian Integration, p. 110. There is the testi-
mony of Attaleiates, pp. 73.11-16 (p. 177) about the massive influx of Armenian Monophysites in 
the Byzantine districts of Iberia, Melitene, and Mesopotamia. The dominance of the Armenian 
language in remote eastern themes is corroborated by the will of Eustathios Boilas. See Lemer-
le, Cinq études, text pp. 20-29.
72 Attaleiates, p. 123.24-25 (p. 303), «διὰ τὸ μέλλειν εἰς τὰ πρόσω τῆς Ῥωμαίων χωρεῖν». Unlike Po-
lemis (Michael Attaleiates, Historia, p. 295; 1997), and Pérez-Martín (Miguel Ataliates. Histo-
ria, p. 123; 2002), Kaldellis and Krallis (Michael Attaleiates, The history, p. 303; 2012) translate 
this phrase as «so that he could march deeper into Roman territory» (my italics).
73 Cheynet, Mantzikert. Un désastre militaire?, p. 424, expresses the view that a large propor-
tion of the imperial army was comprised of Armenians coming from Sebasteia, or Theodosioup-
olis, or Syria and Armenia.
74 Cf. the translation by Kaldellis and Krallis in note 72 above.
75 Leonis Diaconi Historiae, p. 169.23-24.
76 Anonymous, Histoire anonyme de la première Croisade, pp. 56-57, 62-63.
77 Matthew of Edessa, Armenia and the Crusades, p. 134.
78 Based on the accounts of the Muslims writers Ibn al-Athir, ‘Imad al-Din al-Isfahani, Shep-
ard, Byzantinorussica, p. 220, suspects that Tarchaneiotes’ troops were comprised of Russians. 
His suspicion, however, is unverifiable, for he also remarks that the word Rūs in Arabic has a 
double meaning. It may denote either “heads” or “Russians” (p. 219, note 17).
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from the final encounter. We cannot discount the probability that Michael the 
Syrian did not have in mind that the battle lasted two days when he claims 
that the Armenians were the first to abandon their posts.
4. Conclusions
We can sum up as follows: The role of the Armenians, who made up much 
of the Byzantine army, in the battle of Mantzikert stands as another reason 
why the empire was led to the verge of collapse in the eleventh century79. No 
one has examined the subject in depth. Some scholars have nevertheless pro-
duced answers which refute Michael the Syrian’s statement. Their arguments 
are based on three points: A) the exploits of the Armenians in the army80. 
All cases discussed earlier manifest that their exploits were courageous in-
deed, but also spontaneous acts which violated the prescriptions of military 
textbooks. Armenian soldiers were motivated by the gathering of spoils, be-
cause of their lack of pay. (We know that the former emperor, Constantine 
Doukas, had let the regular army to fall apart). The only exception is their 
attack on the plunderers of Ikonion81. It is, however, unknown, as Cheynet re-
marks, whether those Armenians were soldiers or mere citizens of Seleukeia. 
B) The Armeno-Byzantine issues, as described by Matthew of Edessa and Mi-
chael the Syrian, are anachronistic and, therefore, untenable. Nowhere does 
Cheynet or Garsoïan claim that there were no tensions between Armenians 
and Byzantines in that period of time82. Dédéyan notes that they much sus-
pected each other83; and finally C) Diogenes’ trust in Armenians despite their 
failure at Hierapolis during the 1068 campaign84. This, in turn, begs the ques-
tion of whether Diogenes had alternatives. The answer is negative, since the 
Armenians were the most important element in the army not only in terms of 
quantity but also in terms of quality85. Attaleiates points out the acute fear of 
native soldiers whenever fighting against Turks. Even the physical presence 
of the enemy was enough to cause horror in most of them86. The emperor 
was not ignorant of his soldiers’ inexperience in warfare; hence he exempted 
them from sentry duties at Hierapolis87. He delegated more tasks to Armenian 
79 This is thoroughly discussed by Vryonis, Jr., Decline of Medieval Hellenism, pp. 102-103.
80 See note 58 above.
81 See note 47 above. On discipline in the Byzantine army, see discussion in Haldon, Approach-
es, pp. 49-52.
82 Cheynet, Pouvoir et contestations, p. 402; Garsoïan, Armenian Integration, pp. 76, 81.
83 Dédéyan, L’immigration arménienne en Cappadoce, p. 114.
84 Cheynet, Pouvoir et contestations, p. 401. Garsoïan, Armenian Integration, p. 63, endorses 
the same view.
85 Charanis’ view (see note 10 above) is shared by Tourmanoff, Background to Mantzikert, p. 
416.
86 Attaleiates, p. 98.12-13 (pp. 237-239); p. 100.21-22 (p. 245); 101.2-3 (p. 245).
87 On the bad condition of the imperial army over the course of Romanos Diogenes’ opening 
campaign, see Vryonis, Jr., The Eleventh Century, pp. 25-29.
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officers of high rank to assure the discipline of Armenian foot soldiers. This 
could explain why Brachamios had been entrusted with the largest part of the 
army in the 1069 campaign, although he was utterly detested for his failure 
to win decisive victories88. Diogenes’ extreme suspicion of everyone around 
him was catalytic and crucial too. It will suffice here to note an example. Atta-
leiates hints at the emperor’s bitterness, when he was told about the military 
successes of Manuel Komnenos, the commander of the 1070 campaign. The 
Continuator of John Skylitzes, who copies most of Attaleiates’ views, departs 
from his source on this point by saying directly that, «once the ruler was in-
formed about these achievements, he looked as though he were cheerful, but 
had envy inside him»89. We may, thus, conclude that the emperor’s trust in 
Armenians emerged from his entire distrust of his own officers, especially 
those who constituted a direct threat to his power90.
It is important, however, to distinguish between Armenians who did not 
assimilate to Greek society, and Armenians who had been grecised. The first 
could be unreliable, but not necessarily the second. Such is the case of Bra-
chamios, as Garsoïan postulates, who had been Greek in faith, language, and 
customs91; hence he is described by the anti-Chalcedonian Matthew of Edessa 
as a vile and sinful man92. It is notable that only members of the Armenian 
aristocracy who converted to Chalcedonianism became completely integrated 
into Greek society93. Undeniably, the work of Michael the Syrian is marked by 
an anti-Chalcedonian colour too94. Yet, experts in this field treat him as a con-
scientious chronicler whose text provides corroboration for other sources95. 
Michael presents himself as lover of the truth96, while also conceding that he 
collected the material for his chronicle against the Greeks (i.e. Byzantines)97. 
Therefore, the possibility that the Armenians are deliberately condemned for 
their withdrawal from the scene is quite remote. This may be why his claim 
88 See note 42 above. Attaleiates, however, provides no information as to when and where Bra-
chamios fought those battles.
89 Attaleiates, p. 104.20-22 (Bonn, p. 255); Skylitzes Cont., p. 139.19-20, «Πυνθανόμενος δὲ ταυτὶ 
ὁ κρατῶν εὐθυμεῖν μὲν ἐῴκει κρύψας δ᾿ ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸν φθόνον».
90 This conclusion is extracted from Attaleiates’ passage, p. 80.7-11 (p. 193) that describes the 
sack of Neokaisareia in 1068. The author points out that Diogenes was primarily worried about 
the impact of that event to the citizens of Constantinople, implying that his political opponents 
(i.e. the Doukai) would use his failure in order to remove him from power.
91 Garsoïan, Armenian Integration, p. 98, p. 103, note 188.
92 Andrews, Prolegomena, pp. 71-73.
93 Garsoïan, Armenian Integration, pp. 104-105. Thomson, Armenian Literary Culture, p. 233, 
is of the opinion that the Armenians who had taken service in the Byzantine government appa-
ratus or the army were, to a lesser or greater extent, lost to Armenia.
94 The Syrians shared the same faith (i.e. the Monophysite faith) with the Armenians; hence 
Michael the Syrian calls them mhaymnē (the believers). The ones who adhered to the Chalce-
donian confession – i.e. the Byzantine Orthodox Church – were not included in the term. (Wel-
tecke, Michael the Syrian and Syriac Orthodox Identity, p. 117).
95 Weltecke, Some Reflections, p. 21; Abrahem, Michael the Great, p. 44.
96 Weltecke, Originality and Function, p. 194.
97 The Syriac Chronicle (translated by Moosa), p. 739; Chronique (translated by Chabot), p. 447.
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is absent from the Armenian version of his chronicle98. All evidence leads one 
to conclude that a considerable number of Armenians did not take part at 
Mantzikert99. It seems, though, that their withdrawal did not take place in 
the thick of the battle, as the chronicler wants us to believe. It rather was a 
premature flight scheduled by the foreign mercenary troops who had been 
sent off to Chliat under the command of Roussel100. What is difficult to say for 
sure is why the chronicler refers to Armenians only101. This was either because 
they made up the majority of deserters102, or because Tarchaneiotes with the 
Armenians were those who proposed the withdrawal. Despite his initial re-
luctance to follow them, Roussel mustered his mercenaries and headed west-
wards, as the continuator of Skylitzes recounts103.  
98 The deliberate transfer of Armenian bishoprics outside Armenia and the exile of the patri-
arch to Cappadocia after 1045 instilled a national consciousness in people which remained until 
the establishment of a smaller Armenian state in Cilicia (Thomson, Armenian Literary Culture, 
p. 232).
99 This does not mean that several Armenian contingents had not stayed on Diogenes’ side. The 
opinion of Cheynet, who claims that the heaviest casualties were amongst them (Mantzikert, Un 
désastre militaire?, p. 431), seems quite plausible to me.
100 Attaleiates, p. 111.23-26 (p. 273). See discussion in Vratimos, Remarks, pp. 160-162.
101 We may consider as almost certain that several of them were Georgians. See the relevant 
entries of Yuzbashian, Iberia and of Thomson Iberians.
102 According to Cheynet, Les effectifs de l’armée, pp. 323-324, the number of the foreign mer-
cenaries serving in the imperial army was limited in that period of time.
103 Skylitzes Cont., 147.13-14.
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